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The Neoclassical Perspective
In neoclassical economics the economy is described as a system of interdependent factor and product markets. Labor economists focus attention on the subsystem of interdependent competitive labor markets embedded in the competitive market system that describes the economic system as a whole. In neoclassical labor market theory both the equilibrium wage (i.e., price) of a unit of labor service, and the equilibrium level of employment of units of labor service are determined by the equation of the supply of and demand for labor services under competitive conditions. The behavior of the suppliers and demanders of labor is explained by their desire to maximize their subjective utility (i.e. , satisfactions). The objective of maximizing profit often used to explain employer behavior is simply a proxy for the utility maximizing objective of employers. The labor supply function (or curve) relating all possible wage rates and the total quantity of labor supplied at each wage rate in the market is arrived at by summing the supply functions of all individuals who offer labor for hire. In the simplest case each individual's utility is a function of hours of leisure and income. The income is used to gain utility by the consumption of market-supplied goods. In order to maximize utility each individual selects the combination of market goods and leisure that is best for him in the light of restrictions imposed on him by the going market wage (i.e., the price at which he can sell his time as labor services), and the total number of hours of time available to divide between supplying labor to acquire income, and consuming leisure.
The market labor demand function (or curve) relating all possible wage rates and the aggregate quantity of labor demanded is the sum of the labor demand functions of all employers that demand labor in the market. In the simplest case the labor demand function for each employer is determined as follows. Each firm has what economists call a production function. This sums up all the known technological information (i.e., engineering information) about how productive inputs can be converted into output. It is one piece of the total information needed by the firm management in order to choose both the profit maximizing level of production and the profit maximizing method of producing that level of production. The firm owner (or manager) combines the technological information contained in the production function with pecuniary information about the market prices of all inputs, including labor services. This combination of technological and pecuniary information answers the question of the best way (i.e., the cost minimizing way) of producing whatever level of output the firm decides to produce (i.e., the profit maximizing level of output). The firm manager then obtains information about the going market price for firm output, and in the light of this price selects the level of output that will maximize firm profit. This determines simultaneously the profit maximizing level of employment offered by the firm. At this level of employment the value added to firm output by the last unit of labor services employed will be equal to the wage rate paid per unit of labor service in a competitive labor market. This static abstract idealized picture of competitive labor market equilibrium is obviously highly simplified, and there is a rich literature in economic theory considering all sorts of qualifications and extensions of this basic model. Nevertheless, it is the basic building block in the structure of contemporary micro economic theory.
The theoretical prism provided by the theory of competitive labor markets embedded in a system of interdependent competitive factor and product markets has well recognized strengths. The most important of these is that it provides a way of understanding those economic phenomena that are the focus of study in labor economics.
These are the observed levels and structures of wages and employment, and the observed changes in these levels and structures that take place over time. Empirical investigation has revealed repeatedly that observed wages and employment levels and structures resemble in a substantial way what the economist expects to find in the economic world on the basis of the theory of competitive labor markets. Thus the theory is a useful way to understand the world of economic production and distribution, an understanding of which is clearly a primary objective of economic theorizing. Most labor economists believe that the theory of a system of interdependent markets provides more understanding and insight into phenomena of primary interest to economists than any available alternative body of theory. It thus accomplishes a fundamental task of any body of economic theory.
The theory of competition also has an important normative property. Under certain rigorous assumptions, described in the theory of perfect competition, it can be demonstrated theoretically that a competitive economic system produces an optimal solution to the fundamental economic problem of allocation. Competition allocates an economy's scarce resources most efficiently, and efficient allocation has been a major focus for economists following the path breaking theoretical work of Stanley Jevons in England, Leon Walras in Switzerland, and Carl Menger in Austria in the third quarter of the 19th century. Allocation in a competitive economy is efficient in the sense that, given the initial distribution of ownership of the society's scarce productive resources, no individual economic actor's subjective economic welfare can be improved without a negative impact on the subjective welfare of another economic actor. This leads to the proposition that any imperfection in the system of competition that can be eliminated will likely lead to improved welfare in the aggregate, by increasing the subjective utility of some person or persons without decreasing the subjective utility of anyone else. In effect, the removing of a market imperfection will provide some person (or persons) with a cost free lunch (or cost free lunches). This conclusion about the normative social desirability of a competitive system provides a powerful a priori argument in favor of free competitive markets. of an institution to organizations of all types, and coined the term going concern to describe the form taken by organized collective action, and used the term custom to describe unorganized collective action. A going concern was any group that controlled individual action, and it included a family, a union, an informal group, a corporation, a trade association, a business organizations, the Federal Reserve System, the state, and even the aggregate economy. He observed that as individuals enter into the activity of a going concern they alter their habits as they fit themselves into the pattern of the group's activity. 9 Commons claimed orthodox economics had neglected collective action. He attributed this to the influence of Adam Smith and John Locke who established modern economics on the abundance and harmony of nature, rather than on scarcity and conflict.
Commons believed that if Smith had considered scarcity and conflict his attention would have been drawn to the social need to establish harmony through institutional constraints. Smith failed to see that the mutuality he observed among men was the historic product of collective action that created mutuality out of conflict of interest.
Commons had studied the origins of the common law, and concluded it was the visible hand of common law courts, and not Smith's invisible hand, that was the source of social harmony. The courts had taken over customs and enforced them. Smith substituted psychological propensities for customs and institutions. He replaced collective action with the propensity to truck, barter and exchange, the instinct of sympathy, and the sense of propriety, and his focus on these psychological propensities led him to place economics within a framework of individualism where conflict of interest among men the economic, political, and moral power of the parties to the transactions. These differences are ruled out when it is assumed that every party is perfectly free, and equal to every other party. In the transactions controlled by collective action wages, profits, interest, rents, employment, unemployment, and the prosperity or poverty of the nation and its citizens are determined.
In his extensive study of the history of economics Commons discovered that in the orthodox economics of his era concepts relating to material goods were not kept sufficiently distinct from concepts relating to ownership and property rights. In classical and hedonic economics property was thought of primarily as physical property.
Commons concluded that this obscured differences in the meanings of economic terms such as wealth and assets, output and income, efficiency and scarcity, and use value and scarcity value. For example, wealth was often identified with material output, and could be augmented by using inputs with greater efficiency in the engineering sense of Commons regarded the objective of transactional activity as the determination of reasonable values, and reasonable practices, and he was convinced that a theory of reasonable value had to be constructed out of the habits and customs of social life. He fitted the notion of reasonable value to a Malthusian concept of human nature as characteristically passionate, stupid, and ignorant. He believed these characteristics may lead men to act contrary to reason, but he also believed a considerable number of men are able to rise above the level of the least conscientious. The problem confronting institutional economics is the determination of rules of collective action that will bring reluctant individuals up to a reasonable practicable idealism. He was not sanguine about the alternatives for society if this could not be accomplished within a framework of democracy. In the United States of the 1930s he identified Communism, Fascism, and banker capitalism as the three alternatives to what he was proposing, and noted that in the experimental laboratories of Russia, Italy, and America all three were on display. Darwinism and natural science were of limited application [in understanding this process] because in economics selection was purposeful and looked to future results…... [Commons] was ensnared by the American pragmatic myth that human intelligence if only put on the right track could solve all the pressing issues at hand..
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Conclusions
Commons produced a theory of the development and operations of economic institutions. It complemented the orthodox theory of his era since that took the institutional structure of the economy for granted. It is not a substitute for the neoclassical economic theory of his era. Nor is it a substitute for contemporary neoclassical theory, which in many respects has moved far beyond the economics of a Commons' institutional economics contains no comprehensive theory of the structure and operations of the market system. It contains no theory of labor supply or labor demand, and no theory explaining market interdependence. His theory has none of the strengths of neoclassical theory described in the first section of this paper. There is also in
Commons no macro economic theory of growth and fluctuations. His institutional economics is best thought of as a complement to neoclassical theory. 22 Commons' theory lacks the normative aspect of neoclassical theory that enables economists to make judgments about efficient allocation. In fact, the focus of neoclassical economics on efficient resource allocation was not on Commons' plate. He viewed efficiency as an element that must be confronted in a given situation to produce the best transactional outcome, i.e., the most reasonable value. It is primarily an engineering efficiency concept relating to the connection between inputs and outputs in a physical sense, and it is considered from the perspective of the going concerns in each transactional situation, and not from the perspective of the economy in the large. The focus of Commons' work is clearly on problem solving and practice and not on building a general theory. The best solution in each instance depends on the complex set of facts and objectives in that situation. Commons' approach is clearly outside the Walrasian general equilibrium focus of contemporary economic theorizing. His conviction was the practical one that if going concerns in all or most instances of negotiated transactional outcomes can achieve reasonable values, the overall outcome in society will be the socially desirable and ethically correct aggregate outcome.
Commons' work is theoretical, but in a different sense from that in which modern economists normally think of economics as theoretical. It is theoretical in the sense that it aims at providing understanding, and at developing an analytical framework for 22 For an extensive treatment of the substitute complement question see Kaufman, Bruce E., "The institutional economics of John R. Commons: complement and substitute for neoclassical economic theory," Socio-Economic Review, V. 5, 2007, pp. 3-45. theorizing in the investigation of concrete aspects of human behavior. Commons aimed at understanding the genesis of the rules developed by human interaction in the process of resolving conflicts of interest that arise in a context of scarcity. He sought to provide a theoretical understanding of the institutional structure of a market economy. It is a focus on providing a theoretical understanding of certain aspects of human behavior. One purpose of a science of human behavior is to understand why beings like ourselves act as we do. In conventional neoclassical economic theory economists seeks answers to questions of what will be produced and how much will be produced, and for whom it will be produced, and what we may expect from interventions in the system of production and distribution, and all these questions are dealt with in a manner similar to questions posed in the physical sciences, but in a science of human behavior we want to go further and ask why we do things as we do. We look for values, motives, emotions, and purposes. We want to understand, as well as to classify, measure, and mechanize.
Commons recognized that economics is a science of human activity, and in this sense is different from sciences that study mechanisms and organisms that are external to the investigator. His institutional economics is not scientific in the sense of how and how much, but in the volitional sense of why. Thus, Commons' work is not theoretical in the sense in which economists generally use the term theoretical. For most economists theory is only theory if it yields testable hypotheses that can be validated or falsified by empirical investigation. Commons' theory does not yield testable hypotheses. It is a theoretical framework for understanding why the practices we engage in are as they are.
It yields an understanding that is necessary if we seek to evaluate the possibility of improvement in those practices or outcomes that necessarily involve the reconciliation of human wills. From the perspective of the logical positivism that undergirds standard economic theory Commons' work may be regarded at best as a weak or primitive form of theory. It may be thought of as simply a framework that isolates the factors that are important in constructing specific theories to explain what is, but it represents an important theoretical undertaking if we think of the purpose of theory as understanding the why of things.
Commons made two important contributions to modern labor studies. The first concerns his proposition that individual persons act collectively and with purpose as members of a group expressing a group will, rather than as isolated individuals. This contrasts sharply with the methodological individualism of neoclassical economics in which all actions are explained in terms of individual utility maximization with everything affecting motivation subsumed into the individual actor's subjective utility function. The second is his rejection of the proposition that certain economic processes can be studied usefully when separated from other social and cultural influences. He believed ethical, psychological, and legal elements interpenetrate the economic and must be integrated explicitly into any useful social analysis that involve conflicts of human will. The consequence of these two contributions is that his model of the labor market is specific to the situation, e.g., to the industry or occupation. It is based on the existential pattern of the actual market being studied in contrast with the highly formal model of neoclassical economic theory. His purpose was to provide a model useful in describing specific labor markets in a way that could be useful in resolving conflict in reasonable ways. His aim was not to describe an abstract model that could be easily fitted into a comprehensive abstract highly formalized neoclassical model of the economic system.
What practical gain is realized by incorporating this less abstract, more complex, and more realistically descriptive market model into the study of labor economics?
Commons' theory of the labor market meshes well with the focus of industrial relations Industrial Relations Systems was one of the many products of this study. A major conclusion of the Carnegie Foundation funded study was that the fundamental labor problem facing all newly industrializing nations was the structuring of the network or web of rules, both substantive and procedural, that are necessary to making the transition to modern industrial societies. 25 The key point was that every industrial society requires a complex structure of occupations and industries, and for this complex system to work, and especially for it to work effectively, a complex structure of rules is necessary.
Structuring this web of rule was the labor problem these developing nations faced.
Dunlop described the industrial relations system as a subsystem of the general social system, analytically similar to, but distinct from, other subsystems, such as the economic and political systems. The rules students of industrial relations focus on are the product of the interaction of human beings. Dunlop's conceptual framework is useful for making sense of the structure of substantive and procedural rules at the levels of the firm, the industry, and the national economy. The rules can be evaluated from the perspective of economic efficiency, but also from many other perspectives. For example, they can be evaluated from the perspective of the contribution they may make to the structuring of democratic political society. linking the firm to the labor market. It involves a new theory of the firm to understand how firms deal with problems of co-ordination, incentives, and bargaining. Employment is an intra firm phenomenon and not simply a relationship understood by market exchange. The point focused on is that labor contracts are incomplete, and transactions costs arise because of the incompleteness of these contracts, and a governance structure is needed to fill contractual gaps. The informational requirements of traditional competitive markets may not be met because of informational asymmetries at the time a contract is made (adverse selection) or may arise after a contract is made and begins (moral hazard).
There also may be problems that arise over time as employees become specialized to the relationship (asset specificity). Finally, it is important to note that for those in the Commons tradition work was viewed differently than it was in the orthodox economics of Commons' era. The purpose 27 Gregory K. Dow, "The New Institutional Economics and Employment Regulation," in Bruce E. which he explained that labor had a subjective importance in the life of the worker, and was not valued simply for its objective value as a productive input. Work instead of being viewed as something that had only negative utility was viewed as an opportunity for self-development and self-realization. Work was not just a commodity input valued by its output, but an activity of human beings whose welfare as producers is important, and from this perspective competitive market outcomes may not be optimal. In addition the security of one's person and livelihood was important to self-development and to human cooperation and flourishing. In many ways laissez-faire might be detrimental to human self-development and self-realization. 29 
